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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

K. J. and RUTH ACHTER et. al.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Plaintiffs/Appellants
Vo,

THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the
State of Utah,

Case No. 20040050-CA

Defendant/Appellee

Defendant/Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, by and through counsel,
submits the following Brief in response to the Brief of Appellants.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2003). This
appeal has been reassigned to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2003).
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
(1) What is the statutory meaning of "proceeding" as used in 49 CFR § 24.107,
and
(2) Whether the Plaintiffs in this case (Appellants) were ever parties to the relevant
"proceeding."

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is an issue of
law, and as a result is reviewable on appeal by the de novo standard of review,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During the 1980s the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT")

determined that the Highway 89 corridor between Farmington and South Ogden needed
widening and other improvements to increase public safety. As required by the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), UDOT prepared an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"), published September 9, 1996, which identified that approximately 136
homes and 22 businesses would be affected by the widening of the Highway 89 corridor.
2.

Subsequent to the publication of the EIS, certain property owners along the

Highway 89 corridor became concerned that because their property had been identified in
the EIS, it had diminished in value.
3.

On November 18, 1997, 14 months after the publication of the EIS, three

property owners identified as Robinson, Scadden, and Reichel filed an inverse
condemnation case against UDOT in the Second District Court, hereinafter referred to the
"Robinson case." (Robinson v. State, Civil No. 970700784, Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County.)
4.

During the 1998 General Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature

appropriated $10 million to UDOT for the purpose of "corridor preservation," which
monies were to be applied to hardship cases along the Highway 89 corridor.
2

5.

In February, 1998, UDOT began settlement negotiations with affected

property owners along the Highway 89 corridor.
6.

A "Stipulation to Dismissal" of the Robinson case was signed by counsel

for UDOT on March 19, 1998, and by counsel for the plaintiffs case on March 24, 1998.
The Stipulation dismissed the Robinson case, but preserved the issue of attorneys fees to
be awarded to plaintiffs' counsel and the issue of future potential class action litigation.
(Stipulation of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
7.

On March 16, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel filed an Amended Complaint in the

Robinson case with the Second District Court entitled "Amended Complaint for Inverse
Condemnation along the Highway 89 Corridor, a Class Action." No motion was filed
with the Amended Complaint requesting leave of the Court to amend, pursuant to Rule 15
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"), nor was a motion filed seeking a class
certification, pursuant to Rule 23, URCP.
8.

On March 24, 1998, Defendant UDOT filed an objection to the Amended

Complaint, citing Rule 15, URCP, as the basis for the objection.
9.

Neither the Amended Complaint nor the class certification issue was ever

acted upon by the Second District Court.
10.

The issue of Plaintiffs' attorneys fees in the Robinson case subsequently

became a matter before the Utah Supreme Court in Robinson v. Utah Dept. of
Transportation, 20 P.3d 396 (Utah 2001). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Second District for determination of appropriate attorneys fees. (Attached as Exhibit B.)
3

11.

In the remanded case, UDOT filed a Motion in Limine to preclude evidence

of attorneys fees other than the named plaintiffs in the Robinson case.
12.

Pursuant to the Motion in Limine, Judge Glenn R. Dawson, of the Second

District Court, signed an Order on March 19, 2002, stating that "this court has no
jurisdiction in this action over any person except the four property owners bound by the
stipulation," and that "attorneys fees are recoverable in this matter, only on behalf of the
four property owners . . . " (Order on Motion in Limine, p. 2.) (Attached hereto as Exhibit
C.)
13.

Having been precluded by Judge Dawson's Order, from presenting

evidence as to attorneys fees for parties not named in the Robinson case - though that
Order is subject to appeal - Plaintiffs' counsel filed the subject lawsuit.
14.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed by the Honorable Sheila McCleve, by

Order dated December 12, 2003, resulting in this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Having been precluded from presenting evidence in the Second District Court as to
attorneys fees for parties not named in the Robinson case, Plaintiffs' counsel wants a
second bite at the apple, resulting in this case.
On its face, the obvious first question is whether Plaintiffs' claim even rises to the
level of a regulatory inverse condemnation case, given that an EIS is part of the UDOT
planning process, and mere planning in anticipation of condemnation, without more, does
not constitute a taking.
4

However, that issue does not have to be decided, however, because the language of
the regulation governing, upon which Plaintiffs rely, is so clear, and the cases deciding
this issue are so consistently uniform, that the determination can easily be made that
because the Plaintiffs in this action were never parties to an inverse condemnation
lawsuit, they are not entitled to an award of attorneys fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

DO THE FACTS EVEN WARRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY
BEING A SUBJECT OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION?
Plaintiffs' entire case is based on the assumption that Plaintiffs' properties were

the subject of an inverse condemnation by UDOT. Yet no court has made that
determination and UDOT strenuously denies it. The question is, whether a 14-month
lapse between the publication of the EIS and the filing of the lawsuit constitutes a
sufficient delay to warrant a finding of inverse condemnation. But it is not necessary to
answer that question given the language of the regulation upon which Plaintiffs rely and
the cases interpreting that regulation, as set forth hereinafter.
Nonetheless, to put the matter in perspective, UDOT is a state agency responsible
for the construction and maintenance of federal and state highways in the state of Utah. It
engages in road widening on a continual basis and condemns approximately 1,200 to
1,300 parcels of property each year. All road construction or road widening cases using
federal funds require the publication of an EIS prior to the commencement of
construction. An EIS is part of the planning activities mandated by NEPA, which UDOT

5

is subject to following. The publication of an EIS is not a final decision by UDOT.
Based upon the EIS, UDOT may decide to alter a project, abandon it, or proceed. The
EIS is just one step in the planning process for the widening of a highway.
The rule has long been established that mere planning in anticipation of
condemnation does not, without more, constitute a taking.1 The United States Supreme
Court has explicitly held that pre-condemnation activities do not constitute takings. The
Court has stated:
Appellants also claim that the city's precondemnation
activities constitute a taking. The State Supreme Court
correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's goodfaith planning activities, which did not result in successful
prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so burdened the
appellants' enjoyment of their property as to constitute a
taking. Even if the appellants' ability to sell their property
was limited during the pendency of the condemnation
proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their
property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in
value during the process of governmental decision making,
absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership. They
cannot be considered as a taking in the constitutional sense.
(Emphasis added.)
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1980) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84
L.Ed. 240 (1939) (stating that "[a] reduction or increase in the value of property . . . by
reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project" does not constitute a

*See the annotation entitled "Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of Improvement
as Taking or Damaging Property Affected," 37 A.L.R. 3d 127 (1971).
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taking). The Supreme Court later cited Agins and Danforth with approval for the
proposition that "depreciation in value of property by reason of preliminary activity is not
chargeable to the government." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987).
There is a long standing legal distinction between physical takings and regulatory
takings. In the subject case, there was no physical taking of any of the property owners'
properties. There was only an identification that a potential taking was possible at some
time in the future. Frankly, any property adjacent to a major thoroughfare is subject to a
potential taking at some time in the future. Defendant does not question, though, that
there became a cloud of uncertainty over the status of Plaintiffs' properties once the EIS
was published. But that happens every time government contemplates a project requiring
condemnation.
Though not entirely analogous, the United States Supreme Court held in TahoeSierra Preservation Council Inc., et. al. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et. aL, 535
U.S. 302 (2002), that a moratoria totaling 32 months, while the Regional Planning
Agency formulated a comprehensive land use plan for the Lake Tahoe area, did not
constitute a taking of the property owners' property without just compensation. As the
Court stated: "a rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of property
would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decision making." IdL at 343.
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As Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
"government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Id. at 413.

II.

THE LANGUAGE OF 49 CFR 24.107 CLEARLY INDICATES THAT
"PROCEEDING" MEANS LITIGATION AS THAT TERM IS USED IN
THE REGULATION.
The basis of Plaintiffs' claim for the award of attorneys fees is 49 CFR Part

24.107.2 (Attached hereto as Exhibit D.) In its entirety, the regulation reads:
§ 24.107 Certain litigation expenses. 3
The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for any
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal,
and engineering fees, which the owner actually incurred
because of a condemnation proceeding, if:
(a) The final judgment of the court is that the Agency cannot
acquire the real property by condemnation; or
(b) The condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the
Agency other than under an agreed-upon settlement; or
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in favor
of the owner in an inverse condemnation proceeding or the
Agency effects a settlement of such proceeding. (Emphasis
added.)

2

49 CFR § 24.107 has been adopted wholesale as part of UDOT's state regulatory
scheme, see Rule 933-1-1, Utah Admin. Code.
3

Though not controlling, even the title of the regulation suggests that the
reimbursement of attorneys fees are for "litigation expenses."
8

Because a final judgment of the court was not rendered in the Robinson case and
UDOT agency did not abandon the project, neither subsection (a) or (b) apply. However,
subsection (c) would be applicable. According to subsection (c), an owner of real
property can only recover attorneys fees if one of two outcomes occurs. First, the owner
can recover attorneys fees if a court having jurisdiction over an inverse condemnation
proceeding renders a judgment in favor of the owner. For a court to have jurisdiction
over, or to render a judgment in a condemnation proceeding, that proceeding must be a
lawsuit. Defendant cannot conceivably think of a situation in which a court would have
jurisdiction over a matter that was not a lawsuit. Secondly, an owner can recover
attorneys fees if the agency affects a settlement of such proceeding. "Such proceeding"
inescapably refers to the "proceeding" previously mentioned - which proceeding is
clearly a lawsuit because it is before a court.
The issue here is not what is the dictionary definition of "proceeding." The
question is how is that term used in the regulation. Plaintiffs want to say that the term
"proceeding" has a broad definition in the law. Defendant does not dispute that point.
But it goes without saying that for a court to have jurisdiction over a matter requires a
lawsuit. Clearly "proceeding" in subsection (c) means litigation if the court is to have any
jurisdiction at all.
Because the Second District Court never granted leave to amend Plaintiffs'
Complaint, and never certified the case as a class action, Plaintiffs in this case were not
party plaintiffs in the Robinson case. Therefore, the Plaintiffs in this case have never
9

been parties to an inverse condemnation "proceeding" as that term is used in 49 CFR
24.107.

IIL

CASES INTERPRETING "PROCEEDING" UNDER 42 U.S.CA. 4654(c) HOLD
THAT PRE-LITIGATION ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE,
Plaintiffs' Brief takes the position that Defendants, by interpreting "proceeding" to

mean a lawsuit, are defining the term too narrowly (Brief at 21), or being too
"hyper-technical" (Brief at 15), or engaging in "procedural maneuvering" (Brief at 17).
To support their position they cite a 1951 New Jersey case (interpreting a New Jersey
statute), a 1913 Territory of Hawaii case (interpreting a Hawaii statute), and a 1980
Minnesota case (interpreting a Minnesota statute), none of which deal with 49 CFR §
24.107 or inverse condemnation (Plaintiffs' Brief at 17).
Conversely, Defendants, in equating the term "proceeding" with an actual
"lawsuit" or "action," have relied upon court decisions dealing with inverse
condemnation actions under § 4654(c) of the Uniform Relocation Property Acquisitions
Act ("URA"). 4 Section 4654(c) reads:
The court rendering judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding
brought under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of title 28, awarding
compensation for the taking of property by a Federal agency,
or the Attorney General effecting a settlement of any such
proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such
plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as
will in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General
reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,

4

42 U.S.CA. 4601-4655.
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disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney,
appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of
such proceeding. (Emphasis added.)
The regulation found at 49 CFR § 24.107, which Plaintiffs rely upon for recovery
of their fees, was enacted by the office of the Secretary of Transportation to comply with
§ 4654(c) of the URA. Court cases interpreting § 4654(c) of the URA, have unanimously
held that pre-litigation expenses are not recoverable. As Plaintiffs note in their brief,
"wholesale adoption, by one jurisdiction, of legislative language from another jurisdiction
also presumptively adopts statements of underlying legislative purpose and judicial
interpretations of legislative intent, see De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743
(Utah 1996); State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah App. 1996)." (Plaintiffs' Brief at 16
n.5.)
In Swisher v. United States, plaintiffs petitioned under the URA to recover costs
and attorney's fees incurred for such litigation. 262 F. Supp. 2d. 1203, 1206 (D. Kan.
2003). Initially, plaintiffs' counsel sought to bring a class action on behalf of several
plaintiffs. kL at 1209. However, the Court subsequently severed the claims of the original
plaintiffs, leaving only the Swishers as parties to the action. The District Court held
specifically that legal services rendered on behalf of clients prior to class certification
could not be attributed to the claim later settled on behalf of the named clients. The Court
reasoned that to be reasonable and hence recoverable, attorneys' fees must "accurately
reflect expenses attributable to plaintiffs' counsel's work on behalf of plaintiffs in this
case?" IdL at 1210 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court reasoned that although there
11

may be charges (incurred before the parties were severed) which would have been
incurred had the named plaintiffs brought the instant action only, such charges should be
reduced by one-ninth (the proportion of named to unnamed plaintiffs). Id at 1209. The
Court further stated that "'pre-litigation expenses are precluded from reimbursement
under 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (c),'" (quoting Emenv v. United States. 526 F.2d 1121,1124 (Ct.
CI. 1975)).
In a similar case, City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill, Co., a landowner
brought an action against the city, alleging that the city's operation of civilian flights
through his property's airspace constituted a taking. 25 S.W.3d. 191, 194-97 (Tex. App.
1999) {reversed on other grounds). The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court,
holding that there was a taking but that there was no statutory authority through which to
award such fees because "[Recovery of attorneys' fees is adverse to the common law and
penal in nature, and statutes providing for such recovery must be strictly construed." Id at
201, 206. The Court reasoned that the "[URA] is a federal statute that provides for the
recovery of litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, by plaintiffs who instigate
inverse condemnation proceedings under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of Title 28 of the
United States Code." Id at 207 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court pointed out, §
4654 provides authority for the award of expenses and attorney's fees "in actions brought
in either federal court or the Court of Federal Claims." Id (emphasis added).
In Emeny v. United States, owners of property sought to recover expenses incurred
in an action which awarded them compensation for the United States' storage of helium
12

in a structure located on their property. 526 F.2d 1121, 1123 (Ct. CI. 1975). The United
States Court of Claims held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover costs and
attorney fees incurred in ascertaining the nature and extent of their property rights in the
gas storage capacity of the structure. Id. at 1124. The Court said that "the plain language
of 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (c) precludes the court from including in its award to the plaintiffs
any reimbursement for expenses incurred by the plaintiffs before they decided to file suit
in the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491." Id
In Preseault v. United States, property owners petitioned for attorney's fees and
expenses pursuant to the URA after prevailing on a takings claim. 52 Fed. CI. 667, 66970 (2002). The Court held that "Section 4654(c) does not provide for the reimbursement
of expenses incurred by plaintiffs before their decision to file suit in the Court of Federal
Claims." Id at 671. The Court reasoned that "[ljike the plaintiff who unsuccessfully
attempts to negotiate a resolution of his controversy with the Government prior to
bringing a takings claims, see Emeny% 526 F.2d at 1124, a plaintiff who seeks to reverse
the taking on other grounds cannot recover compensation for expenses incurred to that
end under the URA." Id at 672. The Court further reasoned that although it usually does
not second-guess plaintiffs determination of what costs are reasonable, where a large
proportion of the allowable fees are incurred after liability is determined and recovery
under the URA is triggered, the Court cannot defer to the discipline of the market and
must analyze such fees for reasonableness. See, id. at 680.
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In Grantwood Village v. United States, a town which settled a suit it brought
against the United States claiming that the National Trails System Act effected a taking
from the town, requested expenses and attorney's fees for such litigation. 55 Fed. CI. 481,
483 (2003). The Court held that the plaintiffs could not be reimbursed for costs associated
with the quite title action prior to filing their complaint, saying that "[o]nly those costs
attributable to the litigation itself are compensable under the URA." IdL at 484-486. The
Court further held that the "URA permits a plaintiff to be reimbursed for reasonable fees
and costs which are 'actually incurred because of such proceeding [referring to the taking
law suit].'" Id at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). The Court also noted that "[t]his can
include expenses incurred in preparation of a complaint." Id (citing Yancey v. United
States. 915 F.2d 1534, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
In Yancey, turkey farmers filed suit for reimbursement of healthy turkey breeder
stock which was sold at a reduction in value as a result of a quarantine imposed by
USDA. 915 F.2d at 1536. The Court cited Emeny, 526 F.2d at 1124 for the proposition
that "pre-litigation expenses are precluded from reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. §
4654(c)" and cited Clovenport Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 10 CI. Ct. 121, 124
(1986) for the proposition that "'the significant effort expended' in 'the filing of the
petition' may be compensable under the statute if proper documentation were provided."
Id at 1543.
Like most of the original plaintiffs in Swisher who were never certified as a class
and therefore were not parties to the relevant proceeding, none of the Appellants were
14

certified as members of a class to the Highway 89 takings proceeding (the Robinson
case), and consequently never became plaintiffs in such litigation. Therefore, any
"expenses attributable to the plaintiffs' counsel's work on behalf of' the Appellants, who
are "not plaintiffs to this case" are neither reasonable nor recoverable. The Court in
Swisher made a particular point of excluding any fees attributable to unnamed plaintiffs.
It even reduced attorney's fees (incurred before the claims were severed), which the Court
acknowledged may have been incurred even if the plaintiffs "sought to bring the instant
action only."
Each of the courts in the authorities cited herein use the term "proceeding"
interchangeably with "action," "litigation," "suit," "case," etc. There is no precedence for
an award of attorney's fees to persons who were not parties to the inverse condemnation
action. In fact the nature of the Robinson inverse condemnation proceeding was defined
by the Utah Supreme Court in its award of attorney's fees to the named plaintiffs in the
proceeding: "[t]he Utah Administrative Code mandates an award of plaintiff s attorney
fees where UDOT settles the plaintiffs inverse condemnation action. " Robinson at 402.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS ERR IN ALLEGING THAT "THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA:'
Plaintiffs want to make hay out of the fact that the trial court addressed the issue of

res judicata. Plaintiffs err. The issue of res judicata was raised by Defendant in its
original "Motion to Dismiss," as an alternative theory. Defendant felt so strongly about
its position regarding the language of 49 CFR § 24.107 and the cases cited above
15

interpreting the term "proceeding," that it wanted to preclude Plaintiffs from responding
by saying "oops, maybe we were parties in the Robinson case."
If they took that position, then Defendant wanted to make it clear that the matter
had already been ruled upon by the Second District Court, and was not a matter to be
reconsidered by the Third District Court. Defendant said in its Motion to Dismiss:
It is Defendants' firm position that the Plaintiffs in this action
are not entitled to the recovery of attorneys fees because they
were never certified as class members in the 1997 inverse
condemnation proceeding, and therefore have never brought a
lawsuit and were never part of the settlement of the 1997 case.
However, were this Court to find that for some reason
Plaintiffs in this case were to be treated as plaintiffs in the
earlier action, then Plaintiffs claims are also precluded by res
judicata. Judge Dawson has already heard and ruled on the
claims brought by Plaintiffs in this action.
(Motion to Dismiss at 8).
The order of the court likewise follows the alternative theory. The order says: "If
the Plaintiffs though not certified as a class and not named in the previous action, were
parties to that action, then they are bound by the Second District Court's ruling by the
doctrine of res judicata and the appropriate remedy is an appeal of that ruling." (Order of
Dismissal at 4).
The point is Plaintiffs are trapped either way: If the term "proceeding" as used in
the regulation actually means "lawsuit," and Plaintiffs were not parties to the original
Robinson lawsuit, then they cannot recover attorneys fees under the regulation.
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Alternatively, if they then claim to be parties in the Robinson case in the present lawsuit,
then the Second District Court ruling applies.
No error was made by the Third District Court in following that logic.
CONCLUSION
The term "proceeding" as used in 49 CFR 24.107 clearly references a lawsuit, and
the court cases interpreting the same concur.
Therefore, Plaintiffs complaint does not state a cause of action upon which relief
can be granted, and should be dismissed. The Third District Court's ruling should be
affirmed,
DATED this L(o

day of July, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINCTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KAY K. ROBINSON; VANE R. and
M A R i L E E L . SCADDEN; BENJAMIN E.
and LE JOIE REIC11EL; acting in their own
behalf and for all other paitics interested or
otherwise similarly situated,

!

SIIPULAI ION "10 DISMISSAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF UTAI1 and its agency 1 HE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTA1 ION,

Case No.

970700484

Judge

Defendant.

Come Now the PLAINTIFFS and the DEFENDANT, and STIPULA 1 E 1 0
DISMISSAL of Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows.
L The Parties to the above entitled action desire by this STIPULAI ION to fully resolve
all issues raised in the Complaint and to settle all claims and defenses which are the subject

matter of this dispute. This STIPULATION should be construed in the nature of an offer to
compromise and settle the claims Plaintiffs assert against Defendant. As such, the relevant
portions of Rule 408 of the Rules of Evidence are applicable.
2. This STIPULATION shall be binding upon the plaintiffs and Harland and Ardena
Taylor, which constitute the names identified by Plaintiffs counsel at a meeting on December
16, 1997, in which Defendant agreed to a resolution of the above captioned case. All references
to Plaintiffs or parties in this Stipulation shall include the named Plaintiffs and Mr. and Mrs.
Taylor. No other parties shall be added to this litigation, or be governed by the terms of this
Stipulation other than those listed in this paragraph.
3. Any possible class action claims or possible class members will not be affected or
prejudiced by this Stipulation, and this Stipulation is not intended to preclude subsequent
litigation being brought by any person concerning the same or similar alleged class of claims.
4. Pending the completion of the obligations of each party as set forth hereafter, all
rights, defenses and obligations of each Plaintiff and the Defendant under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the laws of Utah shall be held in abeyance without waiver or prejudice to either
party.
5. This Stipulation to Dismissal shall be subject to court approval pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be submitted to the Court for approval prior to further
implementation of the terms herein.
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6. Upon the successful implementation and completion of all duties and actions required
of the parties in this Stipulation, each Plaintiff and the Defendant shall make a joint motion for
dismissal of this action indicating to the court that the Stipulation has been fully implemented as
to that Plaintiff, and asking the Court to dismiss the matter with prejudice.
7. The Plaintiffs have done the following:
A. Requested that the Defendant (UDOT) acquire the Plaintiffs' properties due
to hardships which are individual and particular to them and which they allege are a result of
their need to sell their property and potential for future condemnation and which they allege
make it difficult to obtain a fair value for their properties; and
B. Submitted to the Defendant the addresses and legal descriptions of the
properties owned by each Plaintiff, and the names and address of the owners of record.
B. Met with their counsel to review the amount of the appraisal.
8. The Defendant (UDOT) has done the following:
A. The Plaintiffs' properties have been approved for acquisition by the State
Transportation Commission (Commission) at its regular meeting held December 17, 1997, to be
acquired as far as money in the existing funds (available from rental car sales tax) for hardship
acquisitions permits.
B. The Defendant has met with each of the Plaintiffs at the properties, and the
properties have been appraised in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Relocation
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Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act (Uniform Act).
C. All of the Plaintiffs have been advised that the appraisals are completed.
9. The Defendant (UDO 1) shall do the following:
A. Present the appraisal and offer to purchase to the Plaintiffs, with counsel. A
copy of the appraisal and offer will be left with the Plaintiff and counsel. The offer shall be
made at a time and place convenient to Plaintiffs and their counsel.
B. UDOT shall determine if relocation and other assistance will be available for
each of the Plaintiffs, and shall offer to the Plaintiffs the amount of assistance available. 1 he
amount of relocation assistance will be determined based on the criteria for assistance under the
Uniform Act, although the payments will be made by UDOT without regard to the amount of
assistance, if any, that may be received by UDOT.
C

In the event of an agreement with Plaintiffs on the amount of the offer, the

amount of relocation expenses and other expenses, fees, moving expenses or other payments
offered by UDOT, Delendant shall agree to pay to the Plaintiff the agiccd upon amount for the
property within 30 days of the agreement unless a anothei time is sepaiately agieed.
10. The Plaintiffs shall do the following:
A. Following receipt of the appraisal and offer from UDOT, the Plaintiffs shall
review the appraisals for accuracy and consistency and shall notify UDOT of any objections or
errors that are believed to occurred.
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D. After UDO V has responded to these objections, if any, the Plaintiffs shall each have
thirty days to either accept the offer, request another appraisal or formal review of the appraisal,
or elect to withdraw from the terms of this settlement Stipulation and the acquisition process, in
accordance with the following procedures.
L In the event that the offer is accepted, the Plaintiff will given written
notice of acceptance to the Defendant, and a stipulated motion for dismissal shall
be executed and submitted to the court piior to payment.
ii. In the event that the Plaintiff elects to have the property re-appraised,
Or to have the review appraisal prepared, the Plaintiff shall pay for the cost of the
re-appraisal or of the new appraisal, and the new or review appiaiser shall be
selected from a list of approved appraisers provided by the Defendant. Upon
receipt of the second appraisal the parties agtcc to be bound by the average of the
two appraisals, or to elect to withdraw from the stipulation process.
iii. In the event that the Plaintiff elects to withdiaw fiom this Stipulation,
then neither party shall be bound by this agicement, and the values determined by
appraisal, the relocation costs, and all agreements and offers made heieundcr shall
noi DC admissible in any subsequent litigation for any puipose without the consent
of both parties.
11. Plaintiffs counsel may move the court for a determination of the appropriate fee as
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part of the motion for approval of this Stipulation. Defendant reserves the right to contest
liability for any attorney's fees.
12. It is the understanding of the parlies that if the amount of funds available from that
source is inadequate to acquire the properties by the date designated, that this Stipulation may be
extended by UDOT for an additional term of 180 days or shall become void and of no effect as to
the Plaintiffs and properties that arc not able to be purchased within the time designated. If the
plaintiffs1 properties are not acquired due to the unavailability of funds, this action shall be
subject to a motion to reopen and to recommence litigation as to that property or properties
without prejudice.
13. This Stipulation represents the entire agreement of the parties and there arc no
collateral agreements either verbal or written thai supplement this Agreement except as
referenced herein.
14. This agreement is to be binding and enforceable against the successors and assigns of
cither party.
15. This entire agreement is intended as a settlement proposal and agreement thai shall
not be admissible in whole or in part in the event of subsequent litigation between these parties
over the subject matter of this dispute or in any other litigation between UDOT and any possible
member of the alleged class.
DATED this ^ffixlay of March 1998
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JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
STEVEN F. ALDER
Assistants Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
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Douglas M. Durbano
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Wfestlaw.
20 P.3d 396
416 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 21
(Cite as: 20 P.3d 396)
[21 Costs €=^194.16

H
Supreme Court of Utah.
Kay K. ROBINSON; Vance R. and Marilee L.
Scadden; Benjamin E. and Le
Joie Reichel; Harland G. and Ardena B. Taylor;
Douglas L. and Janice W.
Frost; and Harold B. and Charlotte A. Austin, acting
in their own behalf and
for all other parties interested or otherwise similarly
situated, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
STATE of Utah and its Agency the Utah Department
of Transportation, Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 990206.
March 6, 2001.
Rehearing Denied March 2, 2001.

Landowners sought attorney fees after settling inverse
condemnation action arising out of federally funded
highway project. The Second District Court, Davis
County, Glen R. Dawson, J., denied motion.
Landowners appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, J.,
held that: (1) DOT was not an "executive department"
within the meaning of the separation of powers clause
prohibiting one department from exercising powers of
another department, and (2) DOT regulation that
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse
condemnation case was valid exercise of delegated
authority.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes
JU Appeal and Error €^>842(2)
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions, but reviews them for
correctness.

Copr. ©West 2004 No

102kl94.16 Most Cited Cases
Attorney fees are recoverable if provided for by statute.
131 Costs €=^194.16
102kl94.16 Most Cited Cases
Authorization
Administrative rules are the same as statutory sources
for an award of attorney fees.
[41 Eminent Domain €^>316
148k316 Most Cited Cases
Even a meritless inverse condemnation action entitled
the landowners to attorney fees under Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulation that incorporated by
reference federal regulation entitling a landowner to
attorney fees incurred in an inverse condemnation case
settled by the DOT. 49 C.F.R. g 24.107; Utah Admin.
CodeR933-l-l.
[51 Constitutional Law C=>76
92k76 Most Cited Cases
Department of Transportation (DOT) was not an
"executive department" within the meaning of the
separation of powers clause prohibiting one department
from exercising powers of another department, and,
thus, the DOT could engage in rulemaking. Const. Art.
5,8 1: Art. 7,8 1.
161 Constitutional Law € ^ 6 2 ( 1 )
92k62(l) Most Cited Cases
Constitutional provision which vests legislative power
in the legislature does restrict the ability of the
legislature to delegate legislative functions to
administrative agencies. Const. Art. 6, § 1.
121 Constitutional Law €^>62(3)
92k62(3) Most Cited Cases
Because the constitution vests the legislative power in
the legislature, administrative agencies may only effect
policy mandated by statute and cannot exercise a
sweeping power to create whatever rules they deem
necessary. Const. Art. 6, § 1.
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1?1 Constitutional Law €=>62(7)
92k62(7) Most Cited Cases

condemnation case was consistent with its delegated
authority and governing statutes which require
cooperation with the federal government in federal aid
projects; the DOT had no discretion in determining
whether to follow the mandates of the Uniform
Relocation Assistance Real Property Acquisition
Procedures Act and its regulations. Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
of 1970, §§ 101-305, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601-4655;
U.C.A. 1953, 63-46a-2, 63-46a-3(7)(a), 72-1-201, 72:
1-208(2).

[91 Eminent Domain € ^ 3 1 6
148k316 Most Cited Cases

[131 Constitutional Law €^=>62(2)
92k62(2) Most Cited Cases

Legislature provided adequate direction and properly
delegated to the Department of Transportation (DOT)
the authority to incorporate federal regulations by
reference, including a requirement to pay attorney fees
incurred by a landowner in an inverse condemnation
case; statutes require the DOT to cooperate with the
federal government in all federal-aid projects and allow
the DOT to incorporate federal regulations by
reference. Const. Art. 6, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 63-46a-2,
63-46a-3(7)(a), 72-1- 20h 72-1-208(2); 49 C.F.R. §
24.107; Utah Admin. Code R933-1-1.

The legislature need not specifically address each issue
that may arise when an agency actually implements the
policy, especially where the administrative agency
lacks any real discretion in implementing the policy.

181 Constitutional Law ^==>62(2)
92k62(2) Most Cited Cases
Where the legislature delegates to an administrative
agency power to make rules and regulations, such
delegation must be accompanied by a declared policy
outlining the field within which such rules and
regulations may be adopted. Const. Art. 6, § 1.

[101 States €=^215
360k215 Most Cited Cases
An agency rule may impose liability on the state for
attorney fees and costs; the potential sources of the
state's liability for costs are not limited to statute or
court rule.
fill States €^>215
360k215 Most Cited Cases

[141 Constitutional Law €^>281
92k281 Most Cited Cases
[141 Eminent Domain €=>316
148k316 Most Cited Cases
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation was
not made unconstitutionally vague by its incorporation
by reference to federal regulation entitling a landowner
to attorney fees incurred in an inverse condemnation
case. 49 C.F.R. § 24.107; Utah Admin. Code
R933-1-1.
*397 Douglas M. Durbano, George W. Burbidge, II,
Layton; Randon W. Wilson, Vincent C. Rampton, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation that
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse
condemnation case satisfied the standard for clearly
expressing the state sovereign's liability for costs; the
regulation expressly provided that the owner would be
reimbursed for attorney fees where the DOT settled an
inverse condemnation action. 49 C.F.R. § 24.107;
Utah Admin. Code R933-1- 1.
[121 Constitutional Law €^>62(7)
92k62(7) Most Cited Cases
[121 Eminent Domain €=^>316
148k316 Most Cited Cases
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation that
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse

DURRANT, Justice:
If 1 Appellants, a group of landowners, filed an inverse
condemnation action against the State of Utah and its
agency, the Utah Department of Transportation
(collectively "UDOT"). The case settled before trial,
but the question of whether appellants were entitled to
an award of attorney fees was left open. The district
court denied appellants' motion for an award of attorney
fees, and appellants appeal that decision. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
% 2 U.S. Highway 89 spans the length of Utah from
Arizona to Idaho, connecting most of this state's
populated areas. At some point in the early 1980s,
UDOT determined that the Highway 89 corridor
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between Farmington and South Ogden needed
significant expansion and improvements to increase
public safety. To this end, UDOT began exploring
potential alternatives, holding public meetings, and
conducting a "scoping study." In compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act, UDOT prepared an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project.
An initial draft was completed in December 1995, and
the Final EIS was issued on September 9, 1996.
If 3 The EIS revealed UDOT's preferred alternative for
improvements as well as other options. Further, the
EIS specifically "identified *398 136 houses, 22
businesses, and numerous public properties and
buildings, that may be impacted to some degree by the
preferred alternative." Appellants' homes were among
these specifically identified properties.
If 4 UDOT anticipated the project would be broken up
into several stages as budgetary constraints allowed.
Because of the uncertainty of state and federal funding,
no dates were set for either the beginning or completion
of any stage of the project or for the acquisition of any
affected property. The exact extent and nature of
improvements remain undetermined. At present, some
work has already begun; however, the entire project
may not be completed for more than ten years.
f 5 After publication of the Final EIS, appellants
attempted to sell their homes. The contemplated sales
were not prompted by UDOT's proposed expansion of
the highway, but rather, by reasons such as job
relocations and health concerns. Appellants claim they
were unable to sell their properties for market value,
however, because, "as a direct and proximate result of
[UDOT's] actions in identifying [appellants'] property
[in the EIS], the value and marketability of the property
ha[d] been negatively impacted." Therefore, appellants
asked UDOT to purchase their homes at fair market
value. The parties were unable to come to terms,
however, and appellants sued UDOT claiming inverse
condemnation. Before trial, the parties stipulated that
UDOT would purchase appellants' homes at mutually
agreeable prices. The stipulation was approved by the
trial court. Because the stipulation did not address the
question of attorney fees, appellants filed a Motion for
an Award of Attorney Fees. The district court denied
the motion; appellants appeal that decision.

56....'" Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16,18,998 P.2d
807 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). Accordingly, "we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and affirm only where it appears that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Id. % 10 (citing Thayne v. Beneficial
Utah, Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994)). We give
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions,
reviewing them, instead, for correctness.
See id.
(citing Geisdorfv. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah
1998)).
DISCUSSION
If 7 Appellants rely upon both federal and state law for
their contention that they are entitled to attorney fees.
As to federal law, they assert that UDOT is required to
pay their fees under the Uniform Relocation Assistance
Real Property Acquisition Procedures Act, 42U.S.C.A.
§§ 4601-4655 (1995 & Supp.2000) (the "Uniform
Act"), and the federal regulations that implement the
Uniform Act. In response, UDOT argues, inter alia, that
the Uniform Act and its implementing regulations do
not provide individuals with a cause of action for
attorney fees, but merely define the relationship
between state and federal agencies.
[2][3] f 8 As to state law, appellants argue that even if
the Uniform Act and its regulations do not directly
entitle them to attorney fees, they are so entitled by
virtue of the Utah Administrative Code, [FN 11 in which
UDOT has adopted wholesale those same federal
regulations. JPN2] We agree. Because we rely on state
law in deciding this case, we do *399 not reach the
question of whether federal law also provides a basis
for the award of fees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

FN1. Under Utah law, an award of attorney
fees is recoverable if it is provided for by
statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).
Since state
administrative rules are implemented pursuant
to statutory authority and have the force and
effect of law, see, e.g., Morton v. State Ret.
Bd. 842 P.2d 928, 932 n. 2 (Utah
Ct.App.1992), we consider them as we would
statutory sources for an award of attorney
fees.

H1116 In arguing the motion for an award of attorney
fees, the parties relied on their pleadings and also
submitted affidavits to the district court. "Where
outside matters are 'presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule

FN2. The federal regulations were adopted by
rule 933-1-1 of the Utah Administrative Code,
which provides as follows: "The State of Utah
incorporates by reference 49 CFR 24 as
amended in the Federal Register, March 2,
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1989, as its administrative rules on the
acquisition of rights of way."

I. APPLICABILITY OF 49 C.F.R. § 24.107 TO
THE SETTLEMENT AT ISSUE
H 9 We first consider the question of whether 49C.F.R.
§ 24.107, as adopted by Rule 933-1-1 of the Utah
Administrative Code, requires, on its face, the payment
of attorney fees in circumstances such as are presented
in this case. Section 24.107 applies "to any acquisition
of real property for ... programs and projects where
there is Federal financial assistance [FN31 in any part
of project costs...." 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a) (1995). In this
case, the parties stipulated, for the purposes of the
motion for an award of attorney fees, that the U.S.
Highway 89 expansion and improvement project would
be "a federally funded state project."

FN3. "The term Federal financial assistance
means a grant, loan, or contribution provided
by the United States...." 49 C.F.R. $ 24.2(j)
(1995).

141K 10 Section 24.107 provides that "[t]he owner of
the real property shall be reimbursed for any ...
reasonable attorney ... fees, which the owner actually
incurred because of a condemnation proceeding, if: ...
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in
favor of the owner in an inverse condemnation
proceeding, or the Agency effects a settlement of such
proceeding."
Id. § 24.107 (emphasis added).
Appellants' complaint includes a claim that UDOT had
inversely condemned their property. That lawsuit was
settled and UDOT "agreed to purchase Plaintiffs' homes
immediately at mutually agreeable prices." Thus, this
case is squarely within the language of section 24.107.
IFN41

FN4. UDOT contests this conclusion by
arguing that the inverse condemnation
proceeding lacked merit. The settlement of
such a proceeding is covered by the plain
language of section 24.107, however,
regardless of the merit of the underlying
claim. Similarly, it is irrelevant whether
UDOT planned to acquire appellants' property
because of the hardship appellants were under
and not because it felt the Uniform Act, the
federal regulations implementing the Uniform
Act, or the Utah Administrative Code
compelled it. It remains a settlement of an
inverse condemnation proceeding, and,
Copr. ©West 2004 No (

therefore, 49 C.F.R. § 24.107 governs.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UDOTS
ADOPTION OF 49 C.F.R. §24.107
K 11 Having concluded that Section 24.107, as adopted
by rule 933-1-1, requires the payment of attorney fees,
we next address the constitutionality of rule 933-1-1's
adoption of section 24.107. UDOT contends that it
unconstitutionally exceeded its own authority in
adopting the federal regulations that implement the
Uniform Act. In so doing, UDOT finds itself in the
unenviable position of arguing that it is not bound by its
own rule. We disagree and hold that UDOT is bound
by Rule 933-1-1.
A. Article V, Section I
£5J^112 UDOT contends that article V. section 1 of the
Utah Constitution limits UDOT's rulemaking authority.
That section provides as follows:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise
any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
Utah Const, art. V, § 1 (emphasis added). In adopting
section 24.107, UDOT engaged in the legislative
function of rulemaking. UDOT contends that, as an
executive branch agency, it was precluded from doing
so by article V, section 1. This argument fails, however,
because UDOT is not a part of the executive branch for
purposes of article V, section 1. The constitution itself
defines those "persons" who are deemed to be a part of
the Executive Department, and that definition does not
include administrative agencies. See Utah Const, art.
VII, £__[. Addressing this question in State v Gallion,
572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), we held as follows:
*400 Since the inhibitions of the Article V, Section
i , are directed toward specific "persons," there is
nothing to restrain the legislative department from
creating administrative bodies to exercise legislative
functions, viz., rule making.
Although
administrative bodies are nominally designated a part
of the executive branch, they do not fall within the
Constitutional definition of the Executive Department
and the prohibition of Article V, Section I does not
apply thereto.
Id. at 687. We see no reason, and UDOT provides
none, for departing from this interpretation. Therefore,
we hold that article V, section 1 does not limit UDOTs
authority, as an administrative body, to make rules.
B. Article VI Section I
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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f 13 UDOT further contends that its rulemaking
authority is limited by article VL section 1 of the Utah
Constitution, which, in pertinent part, vests "[t]he
Legislative power of the State ... [i]n... the Legislature
of the State of Utah...." Utah Const, art. VI, i_L Under
this argument, even if UDOT is not constitutionally a
part of the executive branch for purposes of article V,
section 1, it is, nevertheless, precluded by article VL
section 1 from exercising legislative power because it
is not a part of the legislature either. The first question
that arises in this regard is whether the legislative
power of rulemaking was properly delegated by the
legislature to UDOT.

Utah Code requires that UDOT, "with the approval of
the governor, shall cooperate with the federal
government in allfederal-aid projects and with all state
departments in all matters in connection with the use of
the highways."
Utah Code Ann. $ 72- 1-208(2)
(Supp.2000) (emphasis added). In so cooperating, the
legislature allows UDOT to "incorporate[ ] by reference
... regulation[s] that ha[ve] been adopted by a federal
agency...." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(7)(a)
(Supp.2000). Read together, these statutes demonstrate
a clear delegation by the legislature to UDOT of
rulemaking authority, as well as a legislative policy
directing UDOT to comply with federal mandates for
federal-aid proj ects.

161171181191 % 14 Article VL section 1 does restrict the
ability of the legislature to delegate legislative functions
to administrative agencies. See GalIion, 572 P. 2d at
687 (noting that while article V, section 1 does not
"proscribe the delegation of legislative power,... under
Article VI, Section 1, there are limitations in this regard
..."). Because the constitution vests the legislative
power in the legislature, administrative agencies may
only effect policy mandated by statute and cannot
exercise a sweeping power to create whatever rules
they deem necessary. See State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559,
11 P.2d 340. 341-44(1932). Accordingly, "[wlhere
the legislature delegates to an administrative agency
power to make rules and regulations, such delegation
must be accompanied by a declared policy outlining the
field within which such rules and regulations may be
adopted." Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85
P.2d 831, 834 (1939). The question then becomes
whether the legislature expressed a policy that
adequately directed UDOT in enacting rule 933-1-1.
We hold that it did.

TJ 17 UDOTs wholesale adoption of the regulations
implementing the Uniform Act complies with the
federal mandate that, in order to receive federal
financial assistance, a state agency must either (1) give
assurances *401 to the federal government that it will
comply with the Uniform Act and the federal
regulations implementing the Uniform Act or (2) certify
with the Federal Highway Administration that it will act
according to State laws that are equivalent to the
Uniform Act in purpose and effect. See 49 C.F.R. §
24.4(a)(1) (1995) (requiring assurances); 49 C.F.R. §§
24.601-.602 (1995) (discussing the certification
process). In light of the clear legislative policy of
compliance with federal mandates in such a situation,
the UDOT rule is not in conflict with Article VL
section L of the Utah Constitution. The power to
make such a rule was properly delegated by the
legislature to UDOT.

f 15 Section 72-1-201 of the Utah Code "create[s] the
Department of Transportation which shall: ... (8) in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, make policy and rules
for the administration of the department, state
transportation systems, and programs." Utah Code
Ann. § 72-1-201 (Supp.2000). Thus, the legislature
specifically granted UDOT the power to enact
administrative rules. An agency "rule" is defined as
"an agency's written statement that... (i) is explicitly or
implicitly required by state or federal statute or other
applicable law; (ii) has the effect of law; (iii)
implements or interprets a state or federal legal
mandate; and (iv) applies to a class of persons or
another agency." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(T6)(a)
(1997). Together, these sections evince a legislative
intent that UDOT enact rules to comply with federal
mandates.

f 18 UDOT next argues that beyond the normal
legislative authorization required by article VL section
1 of the Utah Constitution for an administrative agency
to enact a rule, when the agency seeks to enact a rule
creating attorney fee liability its legislative
authorization must be explicit or clearly implied. In
support of this argument, UDOT relies on Tracy v.
Peterson. 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954).

III. STANDARD FOR CREATION OF ATTORNEY
FEE LIABILITY

1119 In Tracy, the trial court imposed costs on the state
pursuant to rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allows costs to be awarded to the
prevailing party. We concluded that this rule provided
an insufficient basis for awarding costs against the
state, holding that "[t]he sovereign is not liable for costs
unless there is some statute or rule of court which
expressly or by clear implication includes it.... The
general terms of a statute giving costs to the prevailing
party do not include the sovereign." Id. at 396.

f 16 And more specifically, section 72-1-208(2) of the
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f 20 UDOT contends that Tracy 's analysis as to an
award of costs would apply a fortiori to an award of
attorney fees against the sovereign. From this UDOT
concludes that it exceeded its own authority in enacting
a rule creating attorney fee liability because it did not
have "clear and explicit statutory authorization" to do

so.
[101 H 21 Assuming, without deciding, that Tracy
applies a fortiori to an award of attorney fees, we
nevertheless conclude that UDOTs reliance on Tracy is
misplaced. Tracy does not purport to limit the potential
sources of costs liability to statute or court rule, thereby
precluding an agency rule as a source of costs liability.
Although Tracy referred to statutes and rules of court
as the most typical sources of costs liability, it did not
address the question of what other sources of law might
provide a legitimate basis for an award of costs.
Instead, Tracy propounds a rule of interpretive
construction that limits the role of a court in imposing
costs liability on the state, but that does not necessarily
limit the role of an administrative agency in enacting a
rule imposing such liability on the state. In the case at
hand, UDOT has enacted a rule providing for attorney
fee liability. The Tracy standard is a limitation on our
latitude in interpreting that rule, not on UDOTs
authority to make the rule. We can impose attorney fee
liability on UDOT only if the rule it enacted expressly
or by clear implication created such liability.
A
different standard applies to UDOT's enactment of that
rule, however. We have held that an agency's rules need
only "be consistent with its governing statutes."
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, as long as " 'thepolicy
andpurpose of the legislation are clearly expressed, the
absence of detailed standards in legislation will not
necessarily render it invalid as an unlawful delegation
of legislative authority.' " Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 422 Mass. 1201, 660 N.E.2d 652, 658 (1996)
(emphasis added) (quoting Chelmsford Trailer Park
Inc. v. Chelmsford. 393 Mass. 186, 469 N.E.2d 1259,
1262 (1984)).
fill f 22 With these standards in mind, we turn to the
statute and administrative rule at issue in the case at
hand. Again, assuming that Tracy applies a fortiori to
an award of attorney fees, we first consider the question
of whether section 24.107, as adopted by UDOT in rule
933-1-1, satisfies the Tracy standard. Clearly, it does.
It expressly provides that the owner of real property
shall be reimbursed for attorney *402 fees where an
agency settles a condemnation action.

legislative policy to cooperate with the federal
government on federal-aid projects. It is unnecessary
for the legislature to specifically address each issue that
may arise when an agency actually implements the
policy. This is especially true where, as here, the
administrative agency lacks any real discretion in
implementing the policy. The legislature dictated that
UDOT must comply with federal mandates and, more
specifically, cooperate with the federal government in
federal aid projects. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-2,
72-1-201, and 72-1-208(2). In light of these directives,
UDOT had no discretion in determining whether to
follow the mandates of the Uniform Act and its
implementing regulations. By adopting a rule that
complied with federal requirements, UDOT acted
consistently with the legislative directives of sections
72-1-201,63-46a-2, and 72-1 -208(2) of the Utah Code.
We decline to apply a more rigorous standard to an
agency's rulemaking solely because that rulemaking
creates attorney fee liability, and conclude that UDOTs
adoption of a rule creating attorney fee liability was
consistent with the authority delegated to it by the
legislature.
IV. VAGUENESS
£14] f 24 Finally, UDOT contends that the
administrative rule itself is too vague to create liability
as it only incorporates by reference the federal
regulations. We find no merit in this. As incorporated
in the Utah Administrative Code, these regulations
specifically and clearly create a right to an award of
attorney fees in settlements of condemnation
proceedings. Therefore, the UDOT regulations are
valid.
CONCLUSION
1f 25 The district court erred in denying appellants'
motion for an award of attorney fees. The Utah
Administrative Code mandates an award of a plaintiffs
attorney fees where UDOT settles the plaintiffs inverse
condemnation action. We remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

K 26 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice WILKINS
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.
20 P.3d 396, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 21
END OF DOCUMENT

ri21f!31 f 23 We next consider the question of whether
UDOT's adoption of this section was consistent with its
governing statutes. Those statutes include a clear
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KAY K. ROBINSON; VANE R and
MARILEE L. SCADDEN; BENJAMIN E.
and LE JOIE REICHEL; acting in their own
behalf and for all other parties interested or
otherwise similarly situated,

ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 970700484
STATE OF UTAH and its Agency THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Judge Glenn R. Dawson

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion in Limine having been heard by the court on February 22, 2002 at
9:00 a.m., and the court having heard argument of counse! and being fully knowledgeable of the
law and the facts makes the following:

Findings of Fact
1.

This matter was filed November 18, 1997 by the named Plaintiffs; Kay Robinson,

Vane and Marilee Scadden, and Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel; and alleged inter alia to be a
class action.
2

On March 26, 2001 the parties reached a settlement of the matter on behalf of the

named Plaintiffs Kay Robinson, Vane and Marilee Scadden, and Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel
and two additional persons, Harland and Ardena Taylor.
3.

The Stipulation to Dismissal was presented at a hearing held May 18, 1998 in

accordance with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and approved by an Order signed
on June 4, 1998.
4.

Only four property owners were to be governed by the Stipulation to Dismissal

settling this inverse action and all other persons including potential class members were not
bound by its terms and were free to pursue any other remedies against the Defendant.
Conclusions of Law
1.

This case has been remanded to the trial court by the Utah Supreme Court for a

determination of a reasonable attorneys fee to be awarded to the plaintiffs in this matter.
2.

This court has no jurisdiction in this action over any person except the four

property owners bound by the Stipulation.
3.

Attorneys fees are recoverable in this matter, only on behalf of the four property

owners, who are parties to the Stipulation, and evidence of attorney fees will be limited to that

evidence that is relevant to the attorney fee claims of the four named property owners.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby Ordered as follows:
1.

The parties are to complete their designation of witnesses and shall limit

witnesses to those persons who will testify concerning the legal work and attorney fees on behalf
of the four property owners identified in the Stipulation to Dismissal; to wit: Kay Robinson,
Vane and Manlee Scadden, Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel, and Harland and Ardena Taylor.
2.

The parties are to complete all discovery including the exchange of expert reports

and the deposition of expert witnesses or other predicate witnesses to the experts no later than 60
days from this Order.
3.

A Final Pretrial Order shall be submitted by April 8, 2002 and a Final Pre-trial

Conference shall be held April j6, 2002 at 11:00 a.m. at which time a trial date shall be set.
DATED this t ^ d a y of March, 2002.
BY THE COURT

EXHIBIT D

Westlaw
49 CFR§ 24.107
49 C.F.R. §24.107

c
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 49-TRANSPORTATION
SUBTITLE A-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF TRANSPORTATION
PART 24--UNIFORM RELOCATION
ASSISTANCE AND REAL PROPERTY
ACQUISITION FOR
FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED
PROGRAMS
SUBPART B-REAL PROPERTY
ACQUISITION
Current through July 14, 2004; 69 FR 42274
§ 24.107 Certain litigation expenses.

The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for
any reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney,
appraisal, and engineering fees, which the owner
actually incurred because of a condemnation
proceeding, if:
(a) The final judgment of the court is that the Agency
cannot acquire the real property by condemnation; or
(b) The condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the
Agency other than under an agreed-upon settlement; or
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in
favor of the owner in an inverse condemnation
proceeding or the Agency effects a settlement of such
proceeding.

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations,
or Tables>

49C. F.R. § 24.107
49 CFR § 24.107
END OF DOCUMENT
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